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I. INTRODUCTION
The government will hold pharmaceutical manufacturers liable when
they market their drugs for uses not approved of by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). The government will see to it that these
corporations are held criminally liable, civilly liable, and morally
blameworthy in the court of public opinion. And yet few major
manufacturers have ever gone to trial following such an indictment or
the filing of a criminal information. What is more, the term “off-label
promotion,” commonly used by attorneys practicing in this area to
describe the promotion of drug uses that are not FDA approved, is in fact
absent from the relevant legislative materials. Instead, we are made
aware of its existence by following an unfolding and cross-referencing
chain of statutory and regulatory provisions, and by paying close
attention to enforcement actions.
But where there is law, there must be answers, and making sense of
government enforcement in this arena is no different. The foremost
obstacle to clearly defining the law of off-label promotion has been the
lack of judicial review in cases of corporate prosecution. Because
criminal and civil resolution of corporate off-label charges has almost
always come in the form of settlement,1 there is a tendency to think of
off-label promotion as being sui generis—guidance is neither importable
nor exportable, but can only be borne of experience with this particular
area of enforcement. But no area of law that so frequently witnesses
multimillion-dollar settlements can possibly be so opaque.
This Article contends that there are two distinct theories of the offense
of off-label promotion—the informational theory and the institutional

1. In the corporate criminal context, “settlement” is typically reached in one of
three forms: by deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), by consent decrees, or by
corporate integrity agreements (CIAs). DPAs are the most serious form of settlement
because the defendant corporation obtains repose only after a term of usually three to
five years. Until then, a criminal information is filed in federal district court and may be
given effect upon a material breach of the DPA’s terms. See generally Abigail H.
Lipman, Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 359, 389 (2009) (“DPAs . . .
operate like a term of probation before a conviction.”). A consent decree is an agreement
between two parties, sanctioned by a court, that serves the purpose of a permanent
injunction but does not adjudicate the merits of the case. See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n
of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519–24 (1986) (discussing the hybrid
nature of the consent decree). CIAs work permanent changes to the defendant’s corporate
structure and impose strict governance measures the breach of which carry specific
penalties. CIAs are often used in conjunction with DPAs, and the fulfillment of the CIA’s
terms is made a condition precedent to the satisfaction of the defendant’s DPA. See, e.g.,
Corporate Integrity Agreement Between the Office of Inspector General of the Department
of Health and Human Services and Pfizer Inc., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES O FF .
INSPECTOR GEN. (Aug. 31, 2009), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/Pfizer_inc_08
312009.pdf.
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theory. One is concerned with controlling the flow of medical knowledge
and the other is concerned with protecting regulatory legitimacy. Different
kinds of evidence are key under each theory. I argue that although the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) and its accompanying
regulations emphasize the informational theory, federal prosecutors rely
more heavily on the legal arguments that underpin the institutional theory of
enforcement. A corollary to this contention is that the informational
theory of off-label promotion does most of the work in determining the
evolution of FDA policy and guidance with respect to drug marketing
and labeling. The institutional theory, on the other hand, drives the blunt
force of government enforcement, meant to give the regulatory system it
protects an extra measure of deterrent power. I briefly summarize these
two theories below.
A. The Informational Theory
The informational theory posits that off-label promotion, which is the
promotion of a prescription drug for a use not approved by the FDA, is a
punishable offense first and foremost because it corrupts the body of
information available to physicians, thereby placing patients at risk. When
emphasizing this normative justification for prosecution, Department of
Justice officials focus on the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship,
and their legal arguments link off-label promotion either to the poisoning
of the well from which physicians draw their up-to-date medical knowledge
or to the direct undermining of physician integrity.2 Apart from the
criminal provisions of the FD&C Act, the informational theory informs
the ancillary use of the antikickback statute3 and, in the civil context, the
False Claims Act.4
Under an informational theory of the offense, the government’s case
against a manufacturer should be assessed by reference to what is known
about the ways in which physicians assimilate new information.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers will turn points of knowledge diffusion
into access points for effective marketing. Where off-label uses are not
yet widely accepted, defendant manufacturers will target the points of
diffusion. Cases built upon ambiguous evidence of interaction with the
common ranks of the profession are not likely to be strong cases.
2.
3.
4.

See infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
Anti-Kickback Act of 1986, 41 U.S.C. §§ 51–58 (2006).
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
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The informational theory also animates some of the most contested
enforcement positions taken by the FDA. Continuing Medical Education
(CME) seminars and independent research publications have been intense
targets of government scrutiny—especially when openly sponsored in
any way by the pharmaceutical industry.5 Much has been written about
the First Amendment implications of government enforcement in this area,6
but that dimension of the problem will not be discussed at any significant
length here. This Article assumes that the grave First Amendment concerns
attendant in many aspects of off-label prosecution will simply not forestall
government enforcement—at least not in the near future.
B. The Institutional Theory
The institutional theory posits that off-label promotion is a punishable
offense first and foremost because it undermines the FDA’s power to
regulate the prescription drug market—again, putting patients at risk.
When emphasizing this normative justification for prosecution, Department
of Justice officials portray the FDA as the guardian of the public’s health
and wellbeing.7 Off-label promotion is cast as a threat to the agency’s
authority because it undermines the drug approval process, thereby
jeopardizing one of the agency’s most fundamental missions. But it is
also an offense because it frustrates the workings of government generally.
Apart from the criminal provisions of the FD&C Act, the institutional
theory informs prosecutions under the federal health care fraud statute,8
as well as ancillary reliance on both the offense and defraud clauses of
the federal conspiracy statute.9 This normative justification also rests on
the conclusion that off-label promotion causes unapproved expenditures
by the federal government totaling in the millions and more.10 In this
way, it too animates the use of the False Claims Act.
5. See infra text accompanying note 119.
6. See generally A. Elizabeth Blackwell & James M. Beck, Drug Manufacturers’
First Amendment Right To Advertise and Promote Their Products for Off-Label Use:
Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 439 (2003); Margaret Gilhooley, Drug
Safety and Commercial Speech: Television Advertisements and Reprints on Off-Label
Uses, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 845 (2010); Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act
with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901
(2008); Edmund Polubinski III, Note, Closing the Channels of Communication: A First
Amendment Analysis of the FDA’s Policy on Manufacturer Promotion of “Off-Label”
Use, 83 VA. L. REV. 991 (1997).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 131–33.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Jeanne Whalen et al., Glaxo in $3 Billion Settlement, WALL ST. J.
(July 2, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023042997045775026424
01041730.html (reporting that GlaxoSmithKline P.L.C. would pay $2 billion to resolve
civil liabilities owed to the federal government and the states).
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When the government relies primarily on this theory of enforcement,
it likely does so for one of two reasons: (1) fiscal harm to the government
from false reimbursement claims outweighs perceived health risks to the
affected patient population, or (2) its informational case is weak, either
(a) normatively, because the off-label promotion is truthful and
scientifically proven, or (b) legally, because the evidence does not comport
with theories of how new medical knowledge is diffused and adopted.
Cases argued under the institutional theory for fiscal reasons should be
brought solely on civil grounds unless the scheme involved other criminal
elements, such as providing kickbacks for increased off-label prescribing, or
instructing physicians on how to submit deceptive reimbursement claims.
Cases argued under this theory—primarily because of flaws in the
informational case—should be avoided as impinging too strongly on free
scientific exchange. However, there is a narrow doctrinal window under
the federal conspiracy statute whereby a felony charge is appropriate
even under these circumstances.
II. THE TEXT
Off-label promotion is the promotion of an approved drug for any
purpose or use not specifically approved by the FDA, be it indication,
dosage form, or patient population.11 Astonishingly, it is not succinctly
defined anywhere in the United States Code or the Code of Federal
Regulations. Instead, one must construct the prohibition by reading a
series of statutory provisions further defined—and not always intuitively
so—by regulation. Actually, the government has two distinct threads of
positive text along which it may arrive at the offense, and either one will
suffice.12 Although the more detailed route is plainly concerned with the

11. Blain v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 240 F.R.D. 179, 182 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(offering a broad definition of off-label promotion).
12. Courts are not always careful in distinguishing among the bases for off-label
liability—at least when not directly faced with a criminal complaint. See, e.g., In re
Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 2d 96, 104 (D.
Mass. 2009) (summarily citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 331(d), 333(a)(2), 352(f)(1), and
355(a) as the bases for the charge of off-label marketing brought against WarnerLambert Co. to which the company pled guilty in a related criminal action). Many
commentators also fail adequately to distinguish among the statutory bases, see, e.g.,
John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on Regulating
Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
299, 308–11 (2010), though others do dedicate part of their analysis to distinguishing
between the two avenues of enforcement, see, e.g., Allison D. Burroughs et al., Off-
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transmission of information, the other is concerned with the protection
of FDA authority and that agency’s control over regulated industries.
A. Misbranding
Both constructions of off-label promotion begin with 21 U.S.C. § 331,
styled “Prohibited acts.”13 That section prohibits both “acts and the
causing thereof.”14 The most oft-cited construction begins with subsection
(a), which prohibits the “introduction . . . into interstate commerce of
any . . . drug . . . that is adulterated or misbranded.”15 Although no reference
is made to a definition of “misbranded” in the text, the controlling
definition is found at § 352, styled “Misbranded drugs and devices.”16
Subsection (f) provides that a drug will be deemed misbranded “[u]nless
its labeling bears . . . adequate directions for use.”17 This is as far as we
get in the United States Code: a prohibition on the introduction of any
drug whose labeling does not bear adequate instructions. For further
elaboration, one must turn to the Code of Federal Regulations.
The regulations provide that “[a]dequate directions for use means
directions under which the layman can use a drug safely and for the
purposes for which it is intended.”18 But the negative definition is more
useful for our purposes. Directions may be inadequate as a result of
“omission, in whole or in part” 19 of “[s]tatements of all conditions,
purposes, or uses for which such drug is intended, including . . . uses . . .
suggested in its oral, written, printed, or graphic advertising.”20 Thankfully,
the section directs us to a further definition of “intended use,” which is
defined as “the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the
labeling of drugs,” which may “be shown by labeling claims, advertising
matter, or oral or written statements by such persons or their
representatives.”21 Finally, the picture is clear: the law prohibits the

Label Promotion: Government Theories of Prosecution and Facts That Drive Them, 65
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 555, 558–68 (2010).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id. § 331(a).
16. Id. § 352.
17. Id. § 352(f).
18. 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (2011).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 201.5(a).
21. Id. § 201.128; see also Gregory Gentry, Criminalizing Knowledge: The Perverse
Implications of the Intended Use Regulations for Off-Label Promotion Prosecutions, 64
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 441, 443 (2009) (“There is a distinction in the regulations, then,
between the ‘objective intent,’ which determines the intended use of the product, and the
subjective knowledge of the manufacturer, which could change the intended use.”). It is
reasonable to think of this objective intent concept as an oxymoron of sorts. See id.
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introduction of any drug whose labeling does not provide directions for
uses suggested by the manufacturer through oral or printed advertisement.
When assessing whether this prohibition has been transgressed, the
inquiry should actually begin with the final step, 21 C.F.R. § 201.128,
and work its way up to the statutory prohibition. To illustrate: (1) a
manufacturer’s promotion of an off-label use makes that use an intended
use of the drug, such that (2) the FDA-approved directions on the label
are rendered inadequate, thus (3) causing the drug to be misbranded.
Stated this way, it becomes clear that the prohibition is concerned first
and foremost with the perceived intended uses of a drug, and that a
prime agent of that perception is drug marketing. The informational
theory of enforcement thus seeks to control changes in intended use over
time22 by deterring certain persons—namely manufacturers and their
representatives—from contributing to information about the drug beyond
the materials already on the label.
There are, of course, gray areas in which reasonable minds could differ
on whether the marketing at issue actually does create a gap between the
intended use of a drug and the on-label instructions. This will be explored
more fully in Part III. As a textual matter, it is important to note that the
FD&C Act’s “Definitions” section provides instructions by which the
fact finder could at least assess whether the labeling or advertising is
misleading.23 Section 321(n) even instructs us on the sin of omission:
If an article is alleged to be misbranded because the labeling or advertising is
misleading, then in determining whether the labeling or advertising is misleading
there shall be taken into account . . . also the extent to which the labeling or
advertising fails to reveal facts material [1] in light of such representations or
material with respect to consequences which may result . . . under the conditions
of use prescribed in the labeling or advertising thereof or [2] under such
conditions of use as are customary or usual.24

Given that subsection (n) gives instructions for finding that certain
advertising is misleading even as to approved uses, its sweep is broader
than the off-label offense alone. Still, it seems to mandate that a
manufacturer itself police the off-label promotion of its drug—even by
others—by warning against such uses in its own labeling or advertising.

22. The FDA explicitly recognizes that “intended uses of an article may change
after it has been introduced into interstate commerce by its manufacturer.” 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.128.
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), (n) (2006).
24. Id. § 321(n) (emphasis added).
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Failing to do so would constitute the “fail[ure] to reveal facts” deemed
indicative of misbranding.25
In the context of off-label uses, the duty not to omit material facts
could play out in a number of ways.26 Suppose, for example, that Drug
X is approved for Indication Y and that all its labels and print materials—
which together constitute “labeling”27—reveal all material facts, and that
its verbal marketing of Drug X is not to the contrary. Now suppose that
Drug X is frequently prescribed for Indication Z, a slightly less severe
variant of Indication Y, for which Drug X is not FDA-approved. Drug
X’s manufacturer could be liable for misbranding in at least two
scenarios under § 331(n). First, if the government alleges that Drug X
advertising ambiguously implies that it is effective for treating Indication Z,
a fact finder could determine that, even if unintentional, the ambiguous
nature of the advertisement constituted a material omission of the
disclaimer that Drug X is not approved for Indication Z. This renders the
advertisement misleading.28 Second, because Drug X is frequently
prescribed for Indication Z anyway, its use in the treatment of that
disease is a “customary or usual”29 condition of use, and the failure to
indicate that Drug X is not approved for Indication Z again renders the
labeling misleading—even where there is no allegation of a suggestive
claim.30
These illustrations demonstrate the breadth of the theories the government
could employ on the basis of § 331(a). Although the face of that subsection
alone would not necessarily lead to such expansive theories, the regulatory
texts implementing the prohibition do their own work without the need
25. Id.
26. See Vicki W. Girard, Punishing Pharmaceutical Companies for Unlawful
Promotion of Approved Drugs: Why the False Claims Act Is the Wrong Rx, 12 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 119, 134 (2009) (noting that the vast majority of misbranding violations
identified by FDA warning letters are of the omission or minimization variety).
27. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2006) (“The term ‘labeling’ means all labels and
other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or
wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”).
28. Cf. United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(discussing how promotion of off-label uses could be “potentially misleading because
without the appropriate disclosures the other party may not be able to distinguish
between off-label uses and FDA-approved uses”). The Caputo court faced a somewhat
different question than posed by my hypothetical because there the promotion was
assumed to be off-label, and the question was whether it was also inherently misleading.
Id. at 920–21. However, the same rationale would apply without finding that the
defendant was intentionally or specifically promoting an off-label use. See id. at 921.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n).
30. For example, in In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., the defendant manufacturer
did exercise its duty to indicate that the drug was not approved for certain frequently
prescribed off-label uses. See 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 414–16 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing
the part of label that read: “ZYPREXA (olanzapine) is not approved for the treatment of
patients with dementia-related psychosis” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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for judicial implication. It is unlikely that a new era of judicial review of
corporate off-label prosecutions would circumscribe what is rather
plainly provided by the text of the FD&C Act and its accompanying
regulations. From an enforcement perspective, it is possible to view the
§ 331(a) prohibition as being actively concerned with the policing of
information and far less concerned with deterring circumvention.
B. New Drug
Another way of arriving at the prohibition is through § 331(d), which
addresses a complementary set of enforcement goals. This second
construction of the prohibition is more straightforward and yet is concerned
with a more abstract danger—challenging FDA control. Deterring
regulatory circumvention is its primary goal, and the policing emphasis
is at the moment of an approved indication’s birth, rather than on its
subsequent development.31 As with the informational danger that § 331(a)
seeks to prevent, one ultimate consequence of challenging FDA control
is harm to the public. But although the two constructions share at least
one concern, they differ in other ways. Subsection (a) is concerned squarely
with postmarket developments that it recognizes to be largely out of its
control; subsection (d) is concerned with premarket processes over which
the FDA has plenary power.
Only one part of § 331(d) relates to off-label promotion specifically.
That subsection prohibits the “introduction . . . into interstate commerce
of any article in violation of section 344, 350d, 355, or 360bbb-3 of this
title.”32 These sections govern, respectively, emergency permit control;33
registration of food facilities;34 effective approval of new drug applications;35
and authorization for medical products for use in emergencies.36 Only
the third, § 355, is relevant to our discussion, but its inclusion among
these disparate concerns suggests that this route to prohibiting off-label
promotion conforms to the institutional theory of enforcement.
Section 355, styled “New drugs,” prohibits “[the] introduction into
interstate commerce [of] any new drug, unless an approval of an
application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See 21 U.S.C. § 331(d) (Supp. IV 2011); 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
21 U.S.C. § 331(d).
21 U.S.C. § 344 (2006).
21 U.S.C. § 350d (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
Id. § 360bbb-3.

921

effective with respect to such drug.”37 Turning again to the Act’s
definitional section, the term new drug is defined as “[a]ny drug . . . not
generally recognized . . . as safe and effective for use under the conditions
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.”38 As
alluded to above, the term labeling “means all labels and other written,
printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or
wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”39
The use of the word accompanying in the labeling definition prong
admits of the need for judicial interpretation, and fortunately that
interpretation is well settled. In Kordel v. United States,40 the Supreme
Court explained: “One article . . . is accompanied by another when it
supplements or explains it . . . . No physical attachment one to the other
is necessary. It is the textual relationship that is significant.”41 Implicit
in this formulation is that the statutory definition of labeling encompasses
only written materials, and that has been the accepted understanding
ever since.42 Whereas intended use for the purposes of § 331(a) includes
statements made by any of the manufacturer’s representatives, even
where they lacked actual authority to make such statements, § 355 is
concerned only with material that the manufacturer must have consented
to because it published the words in written material.
Section 331(d) directly relates to a failure to obtain the appropriate
new drug application (NDA), and the underlying § 355 duties make the
Act’s assumption evident that this breach is one condoned by the
corporate entity directly. Defendants charged under this provision are
most likely being accused of shooting low in their initial application, so
as to get around the enormous financial and time investment needed to
approve a drug for even one broad indication, let alone multiple uses.43

37. Id. § 355(a). Subsection (b) deals with the contents of an application and the
filing thereof. Id. § 355(b). Subsection (j) deals with abbreviated new drug applications.
Id. § 355(j).
38. Id. § 321(p)(1).
39. Id. § 321(m).
40. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948).
41. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
42. Burroughs et al., supra note 12, at 559 n.22 (collecting cases).
43. See James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and
Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L.
295, 304 (2003) (“Permitting off-label advertising for a drug allows the drug manufacturer
to postpone committing to the approval process and thus keep research and development
costs down, while still gaining the revenues from off-label sales.” (citing Steven R. Salbu,
Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of
Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 194 (1999))); Mitchell Oates,
Note, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment Through Production and Disclosure of
Research into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1278–79
(2005) (claiming that a pharmaceutical company will, on average, spend $880 million and
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That is the cornerstone of the institutional theory of the offense, and it
brings with it its own auxiliary charges and calls for the marshalling of
evidence particular to that understanding of the offense.
III. THE INFORMATIONAL THEORY
A. The Normative Framework
The harm that the misbranding provisions of the FD&C Act seek to
prevent—informational corruption resulting in unproven drug treatments—
should be assessed according to the ways in which drug information is
diffused throughout a given field in the medical profession. That is, the
alleged “access points” of marketing should line up with known “diffusion
points” of new medical knowledge. Today, there are three main approaches
to the acquisition of medical knowledge and its use in making treatment
choices: the customary approach, evidence-based medicine (EBM), and
use of clinical practice guidelines (CPGs). Because the diffusion of
information varies with each of these three approaches, the ways in
which a pharmaceutical manufacturer might most effectively promote its
drugs for off-label uses also vary. Government claims are strongest where
the alleged conduct and the dominant approach in a given field or region
are aligned. Conversely, the prosecution’s case is weakest where there
is a mismatch between the type of off-label promotion at issue and the
specialty’s dominant method of processing and adopting new medical
information.
To be certain, the Department of Justice has been forceful in articulating
its normative justifications for prosecution in informational terms.44 For
example, in announcing Warner-Lambert’s payment of $430 million to
resolve criminal and civil charges brought against it, the Department
announced: “This illegal and fraudulent promotion scheme corrupted the
information process relied upon by doctors in their medical decision
fifteen years of testing from the submission of an Investigative New Drug application to the
new drug’s delivery into the market (citing O’Reilly & Dalal, supra, at 304)).
44. See Peggy Chen, Education or Promotion?: Industry-Sponsored Continuing
Medical Education (CME) as a Center for the Core/Commercial Speech Debate, 58 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 473, 473 (2003) (“‘It is after all, only within a particular information context
that a drug really exists.’ . . . [D]rug information is the focus of many struggles between
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the pharmaceutical industry.” (quoting
Richard T. Kaplar, The FDA and the First Amendment, in BAD PRESCRIPTION FOR THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: FDA CENSORSHIP OF DRUG ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION 43, 50
(Richard T. Kaplar ed., 1993))).
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making, thereby putting patients at risk.”45 The Department has continued
to make similar pronouncements in the years following the WarnerLambert settlement, arguing that off-label promotion prevents patients
from “know[ing] that their health care provider’s judgment has not been
clouded by misinformation,”46 or that “[o]ff-label marketing can undermine
the doctor-patient relationship and adversely influence the clear judgment
that a doctor’s patients have come to rely on and trust.”47 In the latest
record-breaking industry settlement, in which GlaxoSmithKline agreed
to pay $1 billion in criminal fines and $2 billion in civil liabilities,48 the
government alleged that “[b]y misstating and exaggerating [the drug’s]
efficacy . . . GSK misled the medical community about the risks and
benefits” of the drug’s use in adolescents, an unapproved patient
population.49 The use of information is at the center of each of these
allegations.
Given the government’s preoccupation with informational corruption,
it seems strange that the law should care only about “the mouth of the
promoter” and “not the ear or intent of the audience,”50 but the two
positions are only superficially at odds. Whereas tort law is concerned
with causation, criminal law is concerned with an individual’s act and
intent. Under the law of attempt, a criminal act willfully committed may
be punished even where its illicit goal is not met.51 But where the line
45. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Warner-Lambert To Pay $430 Million To
Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May
13, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm.
46. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees To Pay
$1.415 Billion To Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promotion of Zyprexa: $515 Million
Criminal Fine Is Largest Individual Corporate Fine in History; Civil Settlement Up To
$800 Million (Jan. 15, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09civ-038.html.
47. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. To Pay
More Than $420 Million To Resolve Off-label Promotion and Kickback Allegations (Sept.
30, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-1102.html.
48. Whalen et al., supra note 10.
49. United States’ Complaint at 4, United States ex rel. Thorpe v. GlaxoSmithKline
PLC, No. 11-10398-RWZ (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2011).
50. United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 391–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(rejecting defendant sales representative’s argument that he did not misbrand the drug
within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) because he administered adequate warnings to
a cooperating physician).
51. See Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (1989)
(“The inchoate crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation are well established in the
American legal system. ‘Inchoate’ offenses allow punishment of an actor even though
he has not consummated the crime that is the object of his efforts.”); Robert E. Wagner,
A Few Good Laws: Why Federal Criminal Law Needs a General Attempt Provision and
How Military Law Can Provide One, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1043, 1051 (2010) (arguing that
the common law deemed it “unjust that defendants got away unpunished simply because
they failed to complete their planned crimes”). It is not necessary to consider the
question of whether there is such a crime as attempted misbranding because the object
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between legitimate and illicit promotion is hard to define, or where minute
and missing facts are needed to determine whether a manufacturer
or its agents have transgressed that line, an inquiry into the “ear or intent
of the audience”52 might redound on that most elusive of legal concepts:
mens rea.
Unlike adulteration, misbranding is not a strict liability offense—or at
least the key elements of the offense call for a finding of knowledge.53
A sophisticated defendant who harbors the intent to promote a drug for
off-label use will seek the most effective means available to influence
prescribing behavior. Herein lies the relevance of physicians’ learning
habits and the informational pathways most often used by pharmaceutical
and medical device companies to alter adoption and utilization rates,
including for legitimate on-label promotion. An aberrant pattern of
physician “detailing” by a sales force division, standing alone, may not
be indicative of corporate intent; it might not even be indicative of the
individual representative’s intent. On the other hand, a few isolated
contacts between company personnel and key “opinion leaders” may
very well be all the actus reus needed for a fact finder to infer an intent
to misbrand a drug under § 331(a). Res ipsa loquitur: The marketing
tactic speaks for itself.

offense itself covers such inchoate offenses as solicitation. Indeed, although § 331(a)
seeks to prevent informational corruption, it criminalizes the affirmative steps taken
toward that goal, so it is in effect its own attempt statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (Supp.
IV 2011).
52. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
53. As discussed in Part II.A, an offense under § 331(a) is determined by reference
to the intended use of a drug as defined in 21 C.F.R. § 201.128, and that definition makes
multiple references to “knowledge.” See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2011). For example,
intended use may be “shown by the circumstances that the article is, with the knowledge
of such persons or their representatives, offered and used for a purpose for which it is
neither labeled nor advertised.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, with respect to
material omission, the regulation explains that “if a manufacturer knows, or has
knowledge of facts that would give him notice” as to a change in intended use, it has an
obligation to bring the label’s directions in line with that intended use. Id. (emphasis
added). Both “knowingly” and “knew” have statutory definitions under the FD&C Act,
and they are defined as, “with respect to information,” having “actual knowledge” or
“act[ing] in deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(bb)(1)–(2) (2006). Subsection (bb)(2) seems to refer to
the question of “defrauding” or “misleading,” but—without here getting into the
contested issue of whether off-label promotion is misleading as a categorical matter—
subsection (bb)(1) plainly refers to the use of the verb to know and the noun knowledge
in 21 C.F.R. § 201.128. Id.
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This Article advocates for the use of epistemological research as a
means of discriminating among evidence of illicit off-label promotion
and in constructing a theory of prosecution—or defense. Courts
adjudicating False Claims Act suits have had experience in enumerating
the ways in which the industry has effectuated its off-label promotional
strategy. For example, the court in United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho
Biotech Products, L.P.54 recounted the various illicit means employed by
the defendant manufacturer: direct marketing to physicians, influencing
the results of independent clinical trials—“Phase IV Marketing Trials”—
rebate programs, and the use of kickbacks.55 This last tactic was itself a
multifaceted endeavor, with the defendant plying its product in return for
discounts given to prescribing physicians, consulting fees, and advisory
board honoraria, as well as cash.56
Taking the conduct in Duxbury as an example, one sees that marketing
tactics, in the abstract, arrange themselves along a continuum of more or
less suspect behavior. We could identify interference with independent
clinical trials as more categorically suspect than the use of rebate programs,
but that distinction is academic without a way of anchoring the particular
marketing tactic within an informational context. How does the tactic
relate to what the manufacturer was hoping to achieve? This is where a
rudimentary understanding of physician behavior plays its role, with
special attention to the diffusion of new medical information and the
differences in adoption and utilization rates across different physician
settings.
Although research on prescribing behavior and diffusion of medical
knowledge has not been without conflicting results over the last three
decades, there is consensus on a number of points relevant to the
informational theory of off-label promotion. Physicians face serious
challenges in assimilating new medical information,57 and their ability to
process new information relevant to treatment choices depends on a number
of factors. These factors include a physician’s degree of specialization,58

54. United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13 (1st
Cir. 2009).
55. Id. at 17–18.
56. Id. at 19.
57. See generally Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False
Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61 (2008) (criticizing causation theories implicit in False Claims Act
suits for off-label promotion as misunderstanding the means by which physicians acquire
the knowledge on which they base their treatment decisions).
58. See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of
Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 405 (2002) (speculating
that “the growth in specialization by physicians . . . may improve their ability to absorb and
critically appraise the new information” (footnote omitted)).
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geographical setting,59 professional status,60 and whether a physician is
part of a group practice, a network practitioner, or neither.61 On the other
hand, “marketing intensity” in itself has been shown by at least some
studies to have no apparent relationship to adoption and utilization rates.62
Something else must account for the past success of off-label promotion.
An analysis that begins with the assumption that the world of
medicine may be divided into one of three major epistemological camps
is an analysis doomed of its own artificiality from the start. But in order
to be effective, sophisticated marketing must be tailored to known
epistemological pathways. Therefore, an understanding of each is relevant
here.
B. The Customary Approach
Until recent decades, the standard for adopting new medical information
was to rely on the opinions of renowned experts within a field or
geographical area, rather than on clinical findings or profession-wide
guidelines.63 In theory, the customary approach values real-world

59. See generally John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations:
A Proposal for Action, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6 (contrasting interregional
heterogeneity in medical practice with intraregional homogeneity).
60. See generally Mary A. Burke et al., The Diffusion of a Medical Innovation: Is
Success in the Stars?, 73 S. ECON. J. 588 (2007) (studying the differential adoption and
utilization rates of new coronary stent technology among “opinion leaders” and “nonstar” physicians).
61. See generally Joel M. Schectman et al., The Effect of an Education and Feedback
Intervention on Group-Model and Network-Model Health Maintenance Organization
Physician Prescribing Behavior, 33 MED. CARE 139 (1995) (studying physician response to
an HMO’s “academic detailing,” as measured by prescription behavior).
62. See Robyn Tamblyn et al., Physician and Practice Characteristics Associated
with the Early Utilization of New Prescription Drugs, 41 MED. CARE 895, 901 (2003)
(measuring marketing intensity by reference to the number of detailing minutes and
advertising pages). But see Robert Pear, Fees to Doctors by Drug Makers To Be Disclosed,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2012, at A1 (claiming that a Times investigation found that “doctors
who take money from drug makers . . . are more willing to prescribe drugs in risky and
unapproved ways”).
63. See Johnson, supra note 57, at 76; Noah, supra note 58, at 382 (“Traditionally,
when unsure about how to proceed, physicians would look to the judgments of ‘opinion
leaders’ in their community for guidance . . . .”); see also Sushil Bikhchandani et al.,
Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades,
J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 151, 160 (“Social psychologists report that people
imitate the actions of those who appear to have expertise.”). But see Oates, supra note
43, at 1279–80 (suggesting that the Physicians’ Desk Reference is the main source
consulted by physicians when prescribing medicine).
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experience over controlled studies,64 casting doubt on the proposition
that off-label prescribing is a consequence of direct-to-prescriber marketing
efforts.65 This skepticism is in keeping with more general studies on the
ability of groups to assimilate new information and to cope with
informational overload.66 Under the “informational cascade theory,”
individuals refrain from independent assessment of new alternatives as
soon as the public pool of knowledge becomes “even modestly more
informative than the signal of a single individual.”67 It would, therefore,
be cheaper for a physician to rely on community standards than to
independently assess and adopt a manufacturer’s off-label claims.
Physicians possessing too limited a supply of time and resources to
assess new clinical data prior to making treatment choices will rely both
on their own—statistically insignificant—observations from practice and
on the choices made by prior individuals who they know or otherwise
trust as a source of information. If “indirect costs of innovation . . . inhibit
adoption . . . when costs exceed [the] actor’s resource potential,”68 then we
can predict which physicians will be more likely to rely on the traditional
approach of deferring to experts in the field. Given that tort law looks to
the “standard of care” in determining liability in malpractice suits,69
physicians with lower professional statuses will have good reason not to
try the latest clinical innovation, especially if it is a decidedly off-label
use.70 Venturing into off-label uses without the backing of trendsetters
in your area of expertise could lead to tort liability.71
64. See Johnson, supra note 57, at 73–75.
65. See id. at 73–74.
66. See generally Bikhchandani et al., supra note 63 (positing that informational
cascades result from the propensity to imitate, an adaptation that allows individuals to
take advantage of information accepted by a prior critical mass).
67. Id. at 155.
68. Barbara Wejnert, Integrating Models of Diffusion of Innovations: A Conceptual
Framework, 28 ANN. REV. SOC. 297, 302 (2002).
69. See, e.g., Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
70. See Noah, supra note 58, at 394; see also Ann Lennarson Greer, The State of
the Art Versus the State of the Science: The Diffusion of New Medical Technologies into
Practice, 4 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 5, 9 (1988) (“[T]he universal
skepticism of practicing physicians regarding the utility of the scientific literature is
startling.”). Query, however, whether Greer’s “universal skepticism” has not been
rendered an overstatement in light of the EBM movement, which is thought to have
gained considerable force since the publication of that article. See infra Part III.C.
71. However, at least one study has shown that the highest rates of new drug
utilization were in drug categories exhibiting homogeneous efficacy where the new
drugs in question showed little or no improvement over existing therapies. See Tamblyn
et al., supra note 62, at 905. Although the study does not distinguish between on-label
and off-label use, the results might suggest that nonleading physicians feel comfortable
prescribing off-label in relatively stable areas, perhaps in response to lower prices or the
availability of free samples. Cf. M.A. Morgan et al., Interactions of Doctors with the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 559, 561 (2006) (“Less than two-thirds
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Knowing that the average physician looks to opinion leaders in
making many treatment decisions, manufacturers will likely target key
figures rather than “nonleading” physicians.72 This hypothesis assumes
both that certain types of physicians—general practitioners or generalpractice pediatricians—are more likely to rely heavily on opinion leaders
than other types—specialists—and that manufacturers would discriminate
between types rather than promoting the off-label uses of its drugs to a
broader cross section of professionals. The former assumption has already
been discussed in this subpart.73 As for the latter, it is fair to assume that
the profit-maximizing approach would be to target only opinion leaders
because that strategy is both more efficient and helps avoid regulatory
detection. The government took note of this tactic in one company’s
placement of off-label material on a password-protected website to
which only “targeted, high-prescribing physicians” were given access.74
On this model of marketing behavior, documented instances of offlabel promotion during a campaign of otherwise broad and uniform
detailing75 make for a weaker case of off-label promotion than the
adoption of an off-label use by an opinion leader within a highly
specialized field following formal contact with pharmaceutical agents.
Whereas the latter may be probative of corporate mens rea, the former
might be the result of efforts by a confused, incompetent, or selfinterested sales representative. For example, in Davico v. GlaxoSmithKline
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,76 the plaintiff admitted that he achieved the

(62.7%) selected ‘knowledge of the efficacy of the sample product’ as a reason for
distributing free samples and 59.7% distributed samples to build a good relationship with
the patient.”).
72. See Burke et al., supra note 60, at 589 (“[P]harmaceutical companies . . . target
‘opinion leaders’ in the medical community in their marketing efforts, on the assumption
that adoption by such individuals will serve as an efficient engine for more widespread
adoption of the drug . . . .”).
73. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
74. Second Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 10, United States ex
rel. Piacentile v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 03-6277 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2008) (“Cephalon has
simply re-directed its strategy to keep it away from the FDA’s regulatory oversight.”).
75. Drug “detailing” refers to the practice of pharmaceutical sales representatives
making office visits to physicians and other health care providers. See Noah, supra note
58, at 431.
76. Davico v. GlaxoSmithKline Pharm., Civ. No. 05-6052-TC, 2007 WL 2984014
(D. Or. Oct. 9, 2007), aff’d, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5153 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2009).
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distinction of top promoter within his sales group by systematically
promoting the drug Wellbutrin for off-label uses.77
The fear that an errant sales representative might place a
pharmaceutical giant on the hook for criminal and civil enforcement
actions, while consistent with a strict interpretation of modern American
respondeat superior,78 should be mitigated by the fact that actions
actually brought by the government place great emphasis on the systematic
targeting of opinion leaders. In United States ex rel. Beilfuss v. Allergan,
Inc.,79 a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act and various
state analogs on behalf of two relators, sixteen states, and the District of
Columbia, the government enumerated the eighteen specific tactics used
to promote Botox for off-label uses.80 Four of these tactics dealt specifically
with the opinion-leader phenomenon. These included use of “Regional
Scientific Specialists” to help find appropriate physicians to “target” for
off-label marketing efforts;81 “use of physician speakers to pay them to
influence other physicians to prescribe off-label”;82 “the use of physicians
as ‘key opinion leaders’ to influence other physicians”;83 and recruiting
doctors to be “traveling mentors” for the company’s “Physician Partnership
Program.”84 The overall “gravamen” of the claims was that Allergan
had “developed and successfully executed a sophisticated marketing plan
with the purpose of inducing physicians to prescribe the prescription
drug . . . for . . . off-label uses (and off-label dosages).”85
Despite the supposed insistence on strict statutory bases for
enforcement,86 actual patterns of government enforcement seem to
reflect the appreciation of an informational theory. For example, some
commentators have noticed that the giving of gifts or other informal
compensation is more likely to trigger serious investigation or prosecution87
than arguably truthful detailing on off-label uses, which will likely only

77. Id. at *2. Of course, the plaintiff also alleged that the manufacturer “actually
expected, and even rewarded, off label marketing.” Id. Were his allegations otherwise, he
would hardly have brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004–07 (9th Cir.
1972).
79. United States ex rel. Beilfuss v. Allergan, Inc., No. 08 CA 10305 RGS, 2008 WL
8081517 (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 2008).
80. Complaint ¶ 2, at 1–2, ¶ 34, at 8–11, Beilfuss, 2008 WL 8081517.
81. Id. ¶ 34(a), at 8.
82. Id. ¶ 34(h), at 10.
83. Id. ¶ 34(n), at 11.
84. Id. ¶ 34(p), at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. ¶ 3, at 2.
86. See Osborn, supra note 12, at 326.
87. See Burroughs et al., supra note 12, at 573 (listing “payments to physicians” as
one of “eight focal points of a typical off-label investigation”).
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trigger warning letters.88 If the customary approach still captures
mainstream medical practice, then investigations that focus on ambiguous
marketing to a broad audience should be less likely to result in formidable
legal charges than investigations that hone in on certain access points of
informational corruption.89
C. The EBM Movement
Evidence-based medicine, a term first used in the 1990s,90 describes
the other major approach to incorporating new medical information
into actual practice. The most widely accepted definition of EBM is the
“conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best [scientific]
evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients.”91
The social science and epistemological research discussed in the
preceding subpart suggest that the rise of EBM is more aspirational than
empirical.92 On a more basic level, there is controversy as to the very
nature of EBM and its relationship to other approaches.
Rather than set “best treatment” guidelines, EBM instructs physicians
to turn to up-to-date clinical data and research findings to assess the
course of treatment in each particular case. The method of assessing
available medical evidence may vary with the peculiarities of a given
practice, but there are at least two universal elements: (1) making certain
that the assemblage of evidence is comprehensive, and (2) deciding how
88. See Paul D. Frederickson, Criminal Marketing: Corporate and Managerial
Liability in the Prescription Drug Industry, 22 MIDWEST L.J. 115, 144–45 (2008). On the
other hand, Frederickson suggests that this distinction is best explained by the
government’s fear “of creating the justiciable controversy that establishes a clear
precedent that truthful off-label promotion is constitutionally protected speech.” Id. at
144. Use of the antikickback statute as a basis for prosecution circumvents that thorny
problem.
89. See Wejnert, supra note 68, at 300 (finding that “[m]edia becomes a channel of
influence on adoption primarily when the innovations are popular, well-defined societal
issues,” whereas “the spread of innovations with private consequences [including new
medical practices] occurs largely due to spatial and temporal contiguity between a source
of a new practice and a potential adopter”). But see Noah, supra note 58, at 438 (“New
information may require multiple avenues of dissemination coupled with the passage of
time before it sinks into the collective medical consciousness and alters prescribing
behavior.”).
90. Caroline Young, Medico-Legal Research Using Evidence-Based Medicine, 102
LAW LIBR. J. 449, 452 (2010).
91. David L. Sackett et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t,
312 BRIT. MED. J. 71, 71 (1996).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 63–68.
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to best structure the medical question meant to be answered by that
evidence.93 These clinical questions are often constructed according to
the “PICO” mnemonic: (P) patient/problem/population, (I) intervention,
(C) comparison, and (O) outcome.94 As with the customary approach’s
dipartite reliance on both personal clinical observation and received
knowledge from opinion leaders, the informational theory of off-label
promotion acts directly upon the structure of EBM learning.
Given that EBM reduces the prominence of personal clinical experience
or knowledge acquired from colleagues,95 my informational theory
counsels for a different evaluation of off-label charges where EBM
dominates. Rather than exercising overt influence over well-placed
opinion leaders, manufacturers promoting their drugs for unapproved
indications will focus on tactics such as inappropriately controlling
independent clinical trials and exerting pressure upon the authors and
editors of leading medical journals. However, the success of an off-label
marketing strategy by the manufacturer need not involve the complicity
of such individuals. Empirical surveys demonstrate that studies of new
drugs funded by manufacturers tend to favor new treatments over the
existing, approved alternatives.96 Coupled with ambiguous indicia of an
off-label marketing strategy, long-term relationships between clinical
investigators and manufacturers might indicate an intent to exploit the
evolving pathways of informational acquisition in the field of medicine
that most closely corresponds to a target market for its drug.
Even where postapproval clinical trials of other indications or dosages
are conducted under the auspices of FDA protocol, questions of fact may
arise as to the manufacturer’s intent in carrying out those trials. Although
the FDA often conditions final approval of an indication on the
manufacturer’s commitment to conducting postapproval studies, the
agency has never exercised its authority to withdraw its approval of an
NDA as a consequence of a manufacturer’s failure to meet that

93. Young, supra note 90, at 452.
94. Id. at 456.
95. See id. at 451 (arguing that the current best scientific evidence component of
EBM is what distinguishes it from “eminence-based medicine” (quoting John M.
Eisenberg, What Does Evidence Mean? Can the Law and Medicine Be Reconciled?, 26
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 369, 370 (2001))); see also Carter L. Williams, Note,
Evidence-Based Medicine in the Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Effect
Will EBM Have on the Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 499 (2004)
(“[A] significant difference between traditional practice and EBM is the reduced
prominence of personal clinical experience.”).
96. Gary Edmond, Judging the Scientific and Medical Literature: Some Legal
Implications of Changes to Biomedical Research and Publication, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 523, 536 (2008).
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condition.97 In past reports, the Office of Inspector General for the
Department of Health and Human Services has expressed concern that
FDA oversight of these so-called Phase IV trials was lax and hardly
prioritized.98 If the threat of NDA-withdrawal presents no deterrent effect,
then those Phase IV commitments that are fulfilled might be evidence of
something other than good-faith compliance.
Phase IV trials are sometimes referred to as “marketing trials” because
their goal is to generate new information about an already-approved drug
in the market. Under the informational theory of misbranding, this can
either bolster a drug’s approved labeling or widen the gap between the
label and its common usage. In any event, its significance to EBM is
obvious. These tests produce the up-to-date information that stale Phase
III results cannot provide. But the “marketing” appellation recognizes
that much of the rationale behind satisfying an essentially nonbinding
commitment is that it will promote the drug’s usage among both those
writing prescriptions and those asking for them.99 This was one of the
relator’s chief allegations in the Duxbury case.100 Although that claim
was discarded in favor of the amended complaint’s allegations of direct
physician kickbacks, the original complaint did allege that the defendant
manufacturer “utilized ‘Phase IV Marketing Trials’ to, among other things,
‘encourage the physician, clinic, or hospital to use the drug in a way which
[wa]s inconsistent with its FDA approved indications and administration
methods.’”101
Because trials deemed to be Phase IV commitments are at least in
theory conducted at the insistence of the FDA, it would be perverse to
argue on the basis of their promotional effects alone that the manufacturer
has committed an offense. Some other evidence must be marshaled to
establish that the Phase IV trials were part of a corporate marketing
scheme whose goal was to expand the common usage of an approved

97. See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
738 (3d ed. 2007).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Jamie L. Aldes, Note, The FDA Clinical Trial Process: Effectuating
Change in the Regulatory Framework Governing Clinical Trials To Account for the
Historical Shift from “Traditional” to “New” Phase I Trials, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 463,
472 (2008) (“Phase IV trials help to promote experiences with the drug to prominent
physicians and the public through marketing.”).
100. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
101. United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods. L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 17 (1st
Cir. 2009) (alteration in original).

933

drug without investing the resources necessary to make a concomitant
change in its label content. Short of that, the bare existence of Phase IV
trials resulting in increased off-label use is nothing more than EBM
properly at work.
The foregoing scenarios are ones in which, depending on the degree of
pressure applied, the pharmaceutical defendant might be properly charged
under statutes ancillary to § 331(a) of the FD&C Act. But the structure
of EMB-inspired clinical questions also informs the types of off-label
claims made by the defendant and thus speaks to the misbranding
charges directly. Referring again to the PICO mnemonic, we find a
number of opportunities for marketing to physicians who might aspire to
the EBM approach, but who face the ordinary informational difficulties
suggested above.
This seems to have been the strategy described by the allegations in
UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co.102 First, the campaign shifted its
focus from psychiatrists to primary-care physicians,103 a less specialized
field with a broader patient market and tighter time constraints per
treatment decision, given the number of different ailments addressed by
each primary-care physician. In accomplishing its marketing goals, Eli
Lilly & Co. did the following: it suggested that, for middle-aged and
elderly women (Population),104 prescribing Zyprexa-olanzapine, a secondgeneration antipsychotic drug (SGA),105 was an appropriate treatment
(Intervention) as compared to the other SGA drugs on the market
(Comparison)106 for the alleviation of anxiety, mood disorders, and
disrupted sleep patterns (Outcome).107 The key to this strategy for offlabel promotion is first to broaden the target audience from one that
more routinely processes new medical information to one that must rely
to a greater extent on the customary approach.
None of this detracts from the reality that EBM will be seen in most
instances as an aid to FDA policy, or even as something that itself
should be the object of protection,108 rather than as another avenue for

102. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010).
103. Id. at 127.
104. Id. at 128.
105. Id. at 124.
106. Id. at 127.
107. Id.
108. E.g., Second Amended Complaint at 7, United States ex rel. Hopper v. Solvay
Pharm., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (M.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d, 588 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2009)
(No. 8:04-cv-2356-T-23TGW), 2007 WL 5118132 (“Off-label promotion diminishes the
use of evidence-based medicine.”); Complaint ¶ 22, at 6, United States ex rel. Beilfuss v.
Allergan, Inc., No. 08 CA 10305 (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 2008), 2008 WL 8081517 (same); see
also Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 24, at 7, United States ex
rel. Piacentile v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 03-6277 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2008) (“Permitting off-
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misbranding. There is far less danger of informational corruption if
physicians turn to the most recent medical evidence in making treatment
choices. Indeed, one of the reasons that the FDA now allows the
dissemination of reprints, albeit in a strictly guided fashion,109 is that the
agency acknowledges the lag in the broader profession’s acquisition of
new information published in journals.110
Despite EBM’s perceived benefits from the lawyer-regulator’s
perspective, there is reason to believe that its advances among physicians
are not significant enough to fully blunt the force of off-label promotion.111
The nature of the concept itself has been criticized as reductionist and
circular.112 A hard EBM approach is impracticable because its application
to real-life clinical settings involves a multitude of patient- and environmentspecific considerations for which there is no research output.113 Providing a
label for the process of integrating “hard EBM” into the “real world” of
patient care has thus been described as a bankrupt endeavor: it requires
physicians to rely on a variant of the customary approach that hard EBM
is supposedly meant to displace.114
In conclusion, the EBM phenomenon provides the government another
informational damsel in distress to be protected through the prosecution
of off-label promotion without affording drug manufacturers a criminal
analog to what, at tort law, is known as the learned intermediary doctrine.
That doctrine states the general proposition that a manufacturer does not
label promotion also removes incentives to obtain definitive clinical study data and
weakens the goal of evidence-based medicine.”).
109. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD
REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL
OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS
AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm.
110. See J. Howard Beales III, Economic Analysis and the Regulation of
Pharmaceutical Advertising, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1370, 1392–94 (1994) (pointing out
symposia as an example of “other mechanisms to speed the diffusion of knowledge [about
off-label uses]”).
111. See Ann MacLean Massie, Note, In Defense of the Professional Standard of
Care: A Response to Carter Williams on “Evidence-Based Medicine,” 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 535, 550 (2004) (“EBM can be extremely helpful to clinicians as far as it goes,
but the current circumstance is that it does not go very far. Because it is a fairly young
movement, the number of medical questions for which there are current data developed
according to principles of scientific methodology are quite limited.” (footnote omitted)).
112. See Mark Cook, Evidence-Based Medicine and Experience-Based Practice—
Clash or Consensus?, 23 MED. & L. 735, 736 (2004).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 740; Massie, supra note 111, at 551.
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have a common law duty to warn patients directly because physicians
act as “learned intermediaries,” processing the manufacturer’s drug
safety information and putting it to best use when writing prescriptions
for their patients.115 With respect to off-label promotion, EBM acts not as
an independent filter granting manufacturers immunity from government
enforcement but rather as the object of protection. The “filter” here consists
of the more easily corrupted, traditional sources of medical knowledge.
The informational theory posits that off-label promotion prevents EBM
from delivering on its own promises.
D. Clinical Practice Guidelines
At first blush, clinical practice guidelines seem to occupy an
intermediate position between the customary approach and EBM, but
from the perspective of one engaging in off-label promotion, the
access points look much the same as under the traditional regime of
deferring to opinion leaders. One widely cited definition of CPGs is that
they are “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and
patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances.” 116 CPGs suggest relatively up-to-date “best practices”
for treatment decisions. CPGs are not dynamic in any true sense—either
they reflect EBM at a given point in time or they reflect the accumulated
judgment of experts in the field.117 Both types of CPGs are content-

115. See, e.g., Blain v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 240 F.R.D. 179, 186 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (“In jurisdictions where the learned intermediary doctrine applies, [the defendant]
may have no duty to warn individual users, depending on each individual plaintiff’s
physician’s knowledge of the risks of prescribing [the drug] to [off-label] patients.”).
A minority-jurisdiction exception to this rule provides that a manufacturer can be liable for
failure to warn of the risks attendant in off-label use where that use accounts for a
significant portion of that drug’s sales. Id. (citing Miles Labs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 184
Cal. Rptr. 98, 103 (Ct. App. 1982)). A conceptually related theory is that of “overpromotion,”
whereby the manufacturer’s duty to warn arises from a saturation of the media with directto-consumer marketing, sometimes arguably for off-label uses. See Salmon v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245,
1253, 1257 (N.J. 1999); Amy D. White, Note, The Mass Marketing of Prescription Drugs
and Its Effect on the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 745, 750–
51 (2000).
116. Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront
Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327, 328 (2001) (quoting
COMM. TO ADVISE THE PUB. HEALTH SERV. ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, INST. OF
MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTION FOR A NEW PROGRAM 38 (Marilyn J.
Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990)).
117. See Noah, supra note 58, at 418.
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based and should therefore be thought of as being fundamentally distinct
from a true EBM approach, which is process-based in nature.118
Although the use of CPGs reduces physicians’ reliance on statistically
insignificant observations from their own practices, the default point of
departure for many CPGs remains the same as under the traditional
approach—the “imminence-based” medicine expounded by opinion leaders.
In prosecuting a case of off-label promotion, the government will find its
most relevant evidence in the relationship between industry and key
opinion leaders, as well as the relationship between industry and the
purveyors of CME seminars. CME seminars help establish the quantum
of consensus necessary to have a treatment plan adopted in a CPG and
are thus at least indirectly a key type of diffusion point for medical
knowledge. In the late 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry began to realize
the potential of turning this diffusion point into an access point, and by
the next decade, Congress was conducting hearings on the effects of this
relationship.119
There is no central body that produces CPGs the way the American
Law Institute produces the Restatements of the Law, so there are often
competing “best practices” identified by “rival” guidelines. Some have
suggested that lawyers might find it useful to distinguish between the CPGs
based on EBM and those based on communal standards of practice.120
The great variety of CPGs allows the government and defendants in
misbranding prosecutions to use the distinction as a tool in assessing
evidence of off-label promotion. Both the approved use of a drug and
the off-label use for which it was allegedly promoted will be known, so
the universe of relevant CPGs will necessarily be a finite one. If the
CPGs that happen to recommend that class of drug for that off-label use
are of the “EBM type,” the defendants can defend against circumstantial
evidence that they influenced experts individually or through CME
seminars. If the targets of the alleged marketing scheme practice in a
field operating under an influential EBM-based CPG, defendants in that

118. But see Rosoff, supra note 116, at 328 (“Because CPGs are the most common
practical embodiment of EBM, the terms . . . have often been used interchangeably [by
some commentators] . . . .”).
119. Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physician’s
Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug
Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117, 155 (2007).
120. See Rosoff, supra note 116, at 329.

937

case would also have something similar to a negative causation defense
in civil False Claims Act suits.
So how do we put all of this together? As an analytical approach, the
informational theory seems better suited to the crafting of regulatory
guidelines and safe harbors than to the prosecution of crime. The preceding
discussions have at times assumed that particular medical fields are
dominated by a single epistemological approach to the adoption and
utilization of new information, but off-label promotion will often entail
the marketing of a single drug to variegated, sometimes unexpected,
medical fields. The informational theory, then, is not a panacea for
shoring up doctrinal bedrock, but it accomplishes at least three things: it
rationalizes and communicates the essence of the misbranding offense; it
could inform the FDA’s development of “best practices” guidelines for
industry with respect to marketing and the compilation and dissemination of
scientific data; and it could serve as an evidentiary tool in the hard cases
of ambiguous marketing behavior.
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
A. The Normative Framework
The institutional theory of off-label promotion essentially asks whether
the defendant has a license—an application—for introducing a new drug
use into the market.121 It is not interested in medical epistemology or the
widening gap between common usage and approved indications. Whereas
the informational theory informs the intellectual underpinnings of the
misbranding offense, exposing exceptions that are mutually beneficial to
regulators and industry alike, the institutional theory is concerned with
circumvention of the regulatory process as a categorical matter. In
effect, its concern is with affronts to regulatory authority. In that respect,
the institutional theory is not, to put it colloquially, “the softer side of
Sears.”
Like the relationship between state sovereign immunity and the
Eleventh Amendment, the institutional theory of off-label promotion and
§ 331(d) are of a piece; yet the former is far more extensive than the
latter. In making it a violation for manufacturers or their agents to
promote a drug use without having obtained a proper NDA, the statute
pinpoints the specific actus reus of the violation, but does not elaborate
much on the actor’s intent or the philosophy behind the prohibition.
Why should prosecutors resort to this seemingly inferior normative
ground for prosecution? Would not normative arguments resting on the
121.
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concerns of the informational theory make for a stronger normative case,
and, by way of publicity, have a stronger deterrent effect? I propose
three broad explanations for why the institutional theory of prosecution
might be emphasized.
First, the primary challenges posed by off-label promotion in the real
world are not sufficiently addressed by the letter of the FD&C Act or its
related regulations.122 Off-label promotion is more often accomplished
through in-person contact, instead of by way of the printed material that
is more easily subjected to regulatory scrutiny. Moreover, even if nonprint
advertising were as easy to regulate as its textual counterpart, the sponsoring
of CME seminars or the dissemination of medical journal reprints are
afforded a certain measure of First Amendment protection, even under
the commercial speech doctrine. So many means of communication fall
through the various cracks of the FD&C Act’s scheme—either because
of the impossibility of fully regulating the field or because of the gaps
imposed by higher law.
Even where the same evidence discussed in the preceding Parts of this
Article could be as useful under § 331(d) as under § 331(a), the penalties
provided by the FD&C Act do not provide enough of a deterrent effect
on their own to keep profit-maximizing firms from approaching off-label
marketing as a cost-benefit proposition. Even where the threat of a
felony conviction or a debarment proceeding is actually posed, a
pharmaceutical company could restrict liability to a lesser subsidiary and
thus insulate itself from the fullest effect of either harsh penalty.123 The
institutional theory of prosecution informs the use of statutes that act at
higher levels of generality and carry weightier penalties, most importantly,
the general conspiracy statute, discussed in the next subpart.124
Second, it is likely that many off-label prosecutions begin at the U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices rather than at the FDA, and federal prosecutors are
less likely to be interested in the nuances of informational theory than
with the frustration of a governmental scheme. The timing of large-scale
settlements between prosecutors and the pharmaceutical companies
indicates that many matters begin with a whistleblower’s filing of a qui

122. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 97, at 541–42 (“The primary problems posed by
advertising for prescription drugs, however, do not appear easily redressable by the
authority to issue regulations or, indeed, to invoke the formal enforcement sanctions
provided by the FD&C Act.”).
123. The FDA has not debarred a single firm since 1993. Id. at 1333.
124. See infra Part IV.B.
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tam action under the False Claims Act. Some of the most significant
such cases—United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc.125 and Duxbury,126
for example—involved former corporate officers. Those cases where the
plaintiffs met with less success—such as United States ex rel.
Hopper v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 127 and Davico 128—involved
sales representatives. The latter arguably have greater firsthand experience
with the sort of conduct prohibited as a misbranding offense under
§ 331(a), but the former necessarily possess greater information about
broader corporate activities and marketing plans. A criminal case can be
built on this latter set of evidence with far less need for the scientific
expertise possessed by the FDA. By contrast, the informational approach
discussed above requires far more sophisticated knowledge of drug
categories and usages. It makes sense to expect that large criminal
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry will be accompanied by the
civil settlement of this former type of False Claims Act suit.
This foregoing reason for emphasizing the institutional theory relies
on a sometimes unfair assumption of lesser expertise on the part of
federal prosecutors. Although this might generally be the case, given
that Assistant U.S. Attorneys are generalists who might handle the
prosecution of any federal offense, recent history illustrates that the
prosecution of off-label promotion has been largely based out of two
offices: the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in Philadelphia, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of
Massachusetts in Boston.129 With the concentration of FDA-related
caseloads in a small number of offices, federal prosecutors there will
necessarily develop an in-depth expertise borne of experience. In fact,
as early as the 1950s there were U.S. Attorneys’ Offices that dedicated a
certain segment of their corps to prosecuting FDA-related offenses.130
125. United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 723 (1st Cir. 2007)
(stating that relator was the vice president of marketing for defendant Pfizer).
126. United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 16
(1st Cir. 2009) (stating that relators were a regional key account specialist and territory
manager for the defendant manufacturer).
127. Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1354 (M.D. Fla. 2008),
aff’d, 588 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2009).
128. Davico v. GlaxoSmithKline Pharm., Civ. No. 05-6052-TC, 2007 WL 2984014,
at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 9, 2007), aff’d, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5153 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2009).
129. E.g., In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 618 F. Supp.
2d 96, 104 (D. Mass. 2009); United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P.,
551 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D. Mass. 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 579 F.3d 13 (1st
Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Mass. 2006),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir. 2007).
130. See Hearing on H.R. 15315 Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health and Env’t of
the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. 46 (1972) (statement of
Stephen Kurzman, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare) (describing the Manhattan U.S. Attorney’s Office as possessing, during his
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, the government believes that
off-label promotion represents a harm beyond the misbranding offense
itself. This affront to regulatory authority poses a threat not only to the
public as a collective of patients but also to the government as a collection
of agencies. In other words, prosecution serves as the backstop that
makes more nuanced regulation and enforcement possible in the first
place. Without blunt deterrence, the mandatory nature of our current
food and drug regime would be tarnished. Under this theory, then, offlabel promotion implicates three larger concerns: the rule of law, the
relationship between regulators and regulated industry, and the financial
interests of the government to the extent that it acts as a health care
manager. These concerns extend far beyond the narrower interests of
the FDA, and so federal prosecutors will not feel tethered to the nuanced
theories espoused by that agency’s own scheme.
Of course, the evidence discussed in the preceding Part does not
become irrelevant under an institutional theory of prosecution. After all,
most prosecutions charge the defendant under both § 331(a) and § 331(d).
Where a certain marketing tactic or other conduct is ambiguous, looking
at the circumstantial evidence provided by its context is still important.
But to the extent that certain evidence is determined to be probative of
off-label promotion, the weakness of its effect upon the medical profession
will probably not play much of a mitigating role in the prosecutors’
exercise of discretion. The offense here is to the FDA as an institution
and as an arm of the U.S. government, not to the public or to the medical
profession directly. The government routinely expresses this conclusion
in its press releases accompanying massive settlements: off-label promotion
“undermines the FDA’s role in protecting the American public,”131 or
“undermine[s] the drug approval process,”132 and, importantly, “also
costs the government billions of dollars.”133 For the government, this
final line of reasoning is another advantage of the institutional theory.

time there in the 1950s and 1960s, a team of prosecutors dedicated exclusively to handling
FDA-related cases).
131. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pharmaceutical Companies To Pay $214.5
Million To Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Zonegran (Dec. 15, 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
December/10-civ-1444.html.
133. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. Off-Label Promotion as a Conspiracy To Defraud the United States
Of all the sections found in Title 18 of the United States Code, few
must be as attractive to those prosecuting off-label promotion134 as § 371,
and in particular the defraud clause of this general conspiracy statute.135
But the defraud clause of § 371 is as beguiling as it is attractive, and
courts have wrestled with its meaning even in matters that are prosecuted
frequently in open court. As applied to off-label promotion, the ultimate
question is whether the manufacturer conspired with others to defraud
the United States by interfering with the operation of the FDA’s regulatory
scheme. The line between the text of § 371 and this reading of the
defraud clause, however, has been somewhat unsteady and, without the
right formulation, its application to the facts of an off-label case can be
unclear.
In this subpart, I begin by discussing the text of § 371 along with the
Supreme Court’s early interpretation of the statute, which is still routinely
cited. Because off-label promotion is an offense that strays far from
common law conceptions of fraud, I focus on the application of § 371 to
cases in which the government has not suffered a pecuniary loss. Finally,
I suggest that the proper inquiry as to off-label promotion should be
whether a drug manufacturer has interfered with the FDA’s function by
undermining the drug approval process. Throughout, I will be referring
to common means of off-label promotion in order to illustrate which
marketing practices can be reached by each of the various formulations
and those which cannot. Particular attention will be given to the “hard
case” of truthful off-label promotion.
1. Statutory Background
Section 371 makes it a crime to “conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose,” where “such persons

134. To review: Although off-label promotion is a term not itself found in the FD&C
Act, its prohibition is embodied in a number of statutory and regulatory provisions operating
together. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (Supp. IV 2011) (prohibiting the “introduction into interstate
commerce of any . . . drug . . . that is adulterated or misbranded”); id. § 352(f) (defining a drug
as “misbranded” if its labeling does not bear “adequate directions for use”); 21 C.F.R. § 201.5
(2011) (defining “adequate directions for use” as directions “under which the layman can use
a drug safely and for the purposes for which it was intended”); id. § 201.128 (providing that
“intended use” is evidenced by “labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written
statements” by manufacturers or their representatives). For a discussion of how these
provisions operate in tandem, see United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389 n.2
(E.D.N.Y. 2008).
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
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do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.”136 Whereas the offense
clause provides a conspiracy charge for those whose object is some other
federal crime, the text of the defraud clause contemplates a substantive
offense. Although the statute limits the punishment for conspiracies to
commit a misdemeanor at the maximum punishment provided for the
object crime, the substantive crime of conspiring to defraud the United
States is not similarly capped.137 This distinction makes charging the latter
type of conspiracy an especially compelling option for prosecutors.138
Aside from the proposition that the defraud clause creates its own
substantive offense not subject to misdemeanor limitations, little else
about this section’s interpretation flows ineluctably from the text. And,
rather than read § 371 against a common law background, courts long ago
established that the defraud offense meant something more expansive
than fraud at common law.139 The most important difference between
common law fraud and the federal defraud offense is that the latter need
not implicate a pecuniary interest.140
To this day, the touchstone formulation for this offense is the one laid
down in Hammerschmidt v. United States.141 There, the Court held that to
defraud “means to interfere with or obstruct one of [the government’s]
lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft, or trickery, or at least by
means that are dishonest.”142 So as not to imbue its definition with too
strict a meaning, the Hammerschmidt Court clarified that this illicit
purpose to obstruct or interfere meant “only that [the government agency’s]

136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. See id. (punishing conspiracies against the United States as felonies, unless the
goal of the of conspiracy is merely a misdemeanor).
138. See Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes by Health Care Providers, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV.
589, 629 (“The choice [between clauses] makes a difference when the federal offense
which the defendants allegedly conspired to violate is a misdemeanor . . . . The same
conspiracy, charged under the ‘defraud’ provision, ensures that the punishment is a felony.”).
139. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966) (“It has long been established
that this statutory language is not confined to fraud as that term has been defined in the
common law.”).
140. Although many opinions of more recent vintage can be cited for this
proposition, see, e.g., United States v. Masquelier, 210 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2000), the
First Circuit stated the proposition dramatically more than one hundred years ago. In
Curley v. United States, the court explained that, “[a]s a moral offense, defrauding the
government of its right and its facilities for rendering a proper service to the people . . .
cuts deeper than defrauding the government of a wheelbarrow.” 130 F. 1, 9 (1st Cir.
1904).
141. Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924).
142. Id. at 188.
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legitimate official action and purpose shall be defeated by misrepresentation,
chicane or the overreaching of those charged with carrying out the
governmental intention.”143 Relying on this famous reading of the defraud
clause, courts concluded that the statute did not require that the means used
to achieve the unlawful goal of the conspiracy be themselves unlawful.144
With such a broad interpretation, courts and commentators have struggled to
apply and define § 371 correctly without unintentionally criminalizing
legitimate behavior.145
Where, as with off-label promotion, the conspiracy146 has as its object
something other than depriving the government of its property, the focus
has been on the conspirators’ intentional “interference” with or
“obstruction” of a governmental function.147 Of course, such interferences
or obstructions necessarily vary according to the governmental function
in question.148 As a consequence, applying one line of interference
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
Christian Davis & Eric Waters, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
523, 530 (2007) (“Virtually any method used to defraud the United States will suffice for
the purposes of the statute.”). In addition to resting upon the traditional Hammerschmidt
passage, this interpretation is supported by the text of the statute, which translates the
common law “overt act” requirement as “any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.”
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (emphasis added).
145. Compare United States v. Goldberg, 105 F.3d 770, 775 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
defraud clause of section 371 has a special capacity for abuse because of the vagueness
of the concept of interfering with a proper government function.”), with Abraham S.
Goldstein, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 428 (1959) (“[I]t
was necessary to leave the definition as open-ended as the functions of government in an
expanding society.”).
146. There is an exception “to the applicability of the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine,” under which intracorporate agents lack the requisite multiplicity to form a
conspiracy, “for intracorporate criminal conspiracies arising under 18 U.S.C. § 371.”
McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1038 (11th Cir. 2000); see also
United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1008 (1st Cir. 1984) (“The actions of two or more
agents of a corporation, conspiring together on behalf of the corporation, may lead to
conspiracy convictions of the agents . . . and of the corporation . . . .”); United States v.
Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 403 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[A] corporation may conspire with
its own agents, officers, and employees in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.” (citing United
States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 972 (11th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds, United
States v. Goldin Indus., 219 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2000))). In addition to conspiracies
among corporate officers for which the corporation may be held liable, a drug
manufacturer might conspire with the sales agencies it charges with handling its drug
marketing. See McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1038.
147. Goldstein, supra note 145, at 438–39 (collecting cases and describing this
category as, “of course, the one which has caused the greatest difficulty”).
148. See generally Brian Rubens, Comment, Common Law Versus Regulatory
Fraud: Parsing the Intent Requirement of the Felony Penalty Provision of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1501 (2005). Rubens argues that, in what he
calls “focused” fraud statutes—as opposed to the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes—the
“structure and purpose” of the background regulatory statutes provide specific
frameworks within which to identify and punish fraud. Id. at 1525. Although he does
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decisions to disparate regulatory contexts can prove not easy. The most
prominent line of interference decisions relies on the Second Circuit’s
opinion in United States v. Klein,149 a tax prosecution. Although I later
argue in favor of a formulation more amenable to the peculiarities of the
misbranding offense, the Klein doctrine serves an important role in the
examination of § 371 because it is well developed.
2. Klein Conspiracies
The Klein opinion itself gives little form to the interference concept,
but it has nonetheless lent its name to the so-called Klein conspiracy.150
In Klein, the defendants were accused of “running an immense whiskey
selling business in a fashion calculated to minimize the amount of United
States income tax they would have to pay,”151 and charged with “conspiring
to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and
defeating the lawful functions of the Department of the Treasury in the
collection of the revenue.”152 In upholding the convictions, the Second
Circuit found that the evidence appeared “directly in line” with the crime
as defined by the “deceit, craft, or trickery” formulation in Hammerschmidt,
and reiterated that the defraud offense is not limited to “the cheating of
the Government out of property or money.”153
Whatever the limitations of the Klein opinion, its progeny have
established the baseline rule that evidence of an interference conspiracy
must prove that impeding the agency was one of the intended objects of
the crime, and “not merely a foreseeable consequence or collateral
effect.”154 But to be found guilty of impeding an agency’s function, the
interference or obstruction “need not be an objective that is sought as an
end in itself.”155 The analogy to off-label promotion seems straightforward:

not categorize § 371 as a focused fraud statute, one must necessarily look at the structure
and purpose of an agency’s organic statute in order to answer whether a defendant has
interfered with the agency’s operation.
149. United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 419 F.3d 719, 720 (8th Cir. 2005) (referring
to a conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding the assessment and collection
of income tax as a “so-called Klein conspiracy”). Like Tucker, the vast majority of cases
deemed to be Klein conspiracies have involved elaborate tax evasion schemes.
151. Klein, 247 F.2d at 911.
152. Id. at 915 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. at 916.
154. E.g., United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 348 (3d Cir. 2002).
155. Id.
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The promotion of a drug for an indication not approved by the FDA is
intended both to bypass the costly new use approval process and to
circumvent the strict guidelines by which manufacturers and their sales
representatives may legitimately discuss off-label uses. That the ends
sought are increased profits rather than regulatory obstruction does
nothing, on its own, to undermine the § 371 charge brought against the
manufacturer or its sales representatives.
But not all instances of off-label promotion will satisfy the prosecution’s
evidentiary burden under the Klein doctrine. Because most courts have
grafted a concealment element into the doctrine, even brazen promotion
for unapproved indications may fall outside the Klein rubric. In United
States v. Gricco, the Third Circuit drew a fine line between evidence of
passive frustration and that of active concealment. According to that
court, evidence that the conspirators did not report their illicit income
was “plainly not enough” to show an objective to impede the IRS, but
evidence that the defendant told other participants to store their illicit
income in safes within their homes, rather than depositing the money in
their bank accounts, was sufficient to sustain a conviction.156
To illustrate the gap between the Klein doctrine and the misbranding
offense, consider the act of verbally promoting a drug for an unapproved
indication. Suppose that the leading medical compendia recognize the
drug as having a therapeutic value in the treatment of that indication,
thereby qualifying this particular usage for reimbursement under Medicare
and Medicaid.157 If a drug manufacturer were to encourage its sales
representatives to discuss this coverage and other supporting medical
literature with physicians, there would be a violation of the FD&C Act
regardless of concealment.158 The same might be said, albeit less
persuasively, of ambiguous materials suggestive of treatments for
which FDA approval is lacking.159 But without at least a modicum of
156. Id. at 348–49.
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(6) (2006) (permitting reimbursement for any drug
usage approved by the FDA or included in certain pharmacological compendia);
United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 723 n.1 (1st Cir. 2007)
(“[R]eimbursement is available for certain off-label uses that are medically ‘essential’ or
recognizable within one of several medical compendia.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396r8(k)(6))).
158. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (2006) (providing that a violation of the
misbranding provisions of § 331 is punishable as a misdemeanor); id. § 333(a)(2)
(providing that a violation of § 331 is punishable as a felony after a prior conviction
under § 333 has become final, or where the violation was committed “with the intent to
defraud or mislead”).
159. Cf. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 127–28, 135–36 (2d
Cir. 2010) (describing, in a False Claims Act case, the defendant’s promotional
materials, which focused on symptoms that are characteristic of a variety of indications,
not all of which the defendant’s drug was approved to treat).
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concealment or evasion, this marketing would not be brought within the
Klein rubric. Indeed, even the hallmark Hammerschmidt formulation
seems to fall short. These illustrations suggest that the concealment element
incorporated into § 371 by the Klein progeny is in large part a byproduct
of the underlying tax evasion schemes at work in those cases.
Although the prosecution of truthful but illicit marketing necessitates
an alternative formulation of § 371, enforcement actions of this sort are
probably far outnumbered by criminal investigations focusing on marketing
practices easily squared with the Klein doctrine.160 When engaged in
off-label promotion, pharmaceutical companies and the sales agencies
with which they contract are likely to obscure their tactics. For example,
in the seminal case of United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis,161
the government alleged that the defendant’s officers concealed its
marketing activity by shredding internal documents and by encouraging
sales representatives not to leave “paper trail[s]” of their physician visits.162
The government fired similar allegations at GlaxoSmithKline, claiming that
it “took steps to evade detection by government agencies and conceal
the real purpose and nature of activities, . . . concealing the documents
that demonstrated the conduct.”163 In United States v. Ballistrea,164 an
individual prosecution involving a far less prominent manufacturer,
the government alleged that the defendant instructed the recipients of
its promotional material to hide the literature sent to them.165 This
conduct would satisfy the Klein formulation without more. As explained
by the Ballistrea court, “such evidence of active concealment and evasion is
more than sufficient” to prove that defendants impeded the “FDA’s
lawful function of regulating the marketing and distribution of medical
devices and drugs.”166

160. See Frederickson, supra note 88, at 144 (arguing that the government is “less
likely to prosecute based solely on truthful off-label promotion” and would instead “send
warning letters and make other threats of legal action”).
161. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass.
2001).
162. Id. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Complaint at 20, United States ex rel. Thorpe v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, No.
11-10398-RWZ (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2011).
164. United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827 (2d Cir. 1996).
165. Id. at 833.
166. Id.

947

3. The Regulated Benefits Formulation
Despite the hoary proposition that the defraud clause is in derogation
of the common law, courts have seen fit to import into § 371 language
reminiscent of so many common law concepts—misrepresentation and
deceit chief among them. These concepts, sounding in the common law
of fraud, have led courts to strained formulations of the offense where
simpler rules could have obtained. The following rule explains cases in
which § 371 convictions were upheld despite the lack of any pecuniary
loss to the government: Parties who engage in transactions covered by a
comprehensive regulatory scheme have a duty not to undermine the
objectives of that scheme, and to do so is to defraud the administering
agency. The mission of each agency informs what it means to undermine
its objectives. In the FDA context, benefiting from practices reserved
for those in compliance with the drug approval scheme undermines
the agency’s fundamental objectives in regulating prescription drugs.
A regulated benefits formulation demystifies the notion that an
unlawful scheme can be perpetrated through entirely lawful acts. It also
explains the outcomes of non-pecuniary-loss cases. Moreover, because
it looks to governing rules and regulations as the source of the parties’
duties, it helps anchor the defraud clause of § 371 in the specific context
within which an offense is committed.167 A manufacturer seeking to
introduce a new drug into interstate commerce agrees to participate in a
comprehensive regulatory scheme replete with myriad regulations,
guidelines, and safe harbors. Under the regulated benefits formulation,
no showing of misrepresentation or trickery is necessary for a § 371 charge
to be sustained against those who interfere with the FDA’s prescription
drug scheme by rendering its approval and labeling requirements less
meaningful.
One entity’s participation in a federal scheme often deprives another
entity of some resulting benefit, such that corruption by current participants
interferes with the scheme’s legitimate goals in a way that defrauds the
agency. In both United States v. Gallup168 and United States v. Barker
Steel Co.,169 for example, the defendants conspired to obtain for themselves
contracts that, under the relevant program’s guidelines, should have
167. See generally Goldstein, supra note 145. Although Goldstein’s chronicling of
the federal conspiracy law’s development through the mid-twentieth century ultimately
yields another multipronged test employing common law concepts, he did recognize that
“[r]egulations and customs as well as statutes furnished standards of duty and
obligation.” Id. at 427. He viewed these standards as relevant, given that “there would
be no conspiracy to defraud the United States if defendants had agreed to do only that
which the law allowed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir. 1987).
169. United States v. Barker Steel Co., 985 F.2d 1123 (1st Cir. 1993).
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gone to other entities. In Gallup, the defendant was tasked with securing
approval from the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) for a local project in return for a share of the finder’s fee received by
his coconspirator.170 Although the government did not suffer any pecuniary
loss and such an arrangement was at most a breach of a relatively minor
provision of the HUD contract,171 the court upheld the § 371 conviction.172
It found that there was “a fundamental compromise of . . . HUD’s[]
interest in having its projects ‘administered honestly and officially and
without corruption and waste.’”173 Whereas the agency in Gallup suffered
harm to a general interest, off-label promotion harms the FDA’s specific
interest in maintaining its approval process, making “fundamental
compromises” of that process by drug manufacturers an even more
serious offense.174
Gallup allows for a forthright application of the regulated benefits
formulation in part because its facts lack instances of overt
misrepresentation. But other cases whose holdings rely on evidence of
misrepresentation have at least emphasized this principle in dicta. In
Barker Steel Co., the First Circuit held that misrepresentations made to
general contractors constituted acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to
defraud the Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) programs of the
Department of Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency.175
The Barker Steel Co. operatives intentionally caused the general
contractors to misrepresent that Barker Steel Co. was a minority-owned
business, which enabled them to secure federal contracts not intended
for them.176 The court employed the specter of “affirmative acts of
misrepresentation and deceit” to distinguish its holding from the Fifth
170. Gallup, 812 F.2d at 1278.
171. Id. at 1273 (“One provision in the contract prohibited the PHA from entering
into any contract or property project in which any officer, employee or board member
has any interest . . . .”).
172. Id. at 1280.
173. Id. at 1276 (quoting United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765, 771 (11th Cir.
1985), aff’d in part sub nom. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987)).
174. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 1998)
(recognizing that the FDA has a substantial interest in forcing off-label uses through the
on-label approval process), vacated in part sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202
F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
175. United States v. Barker Steel Co., 985 F.2d 1123, 1135 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding that a § 371 allegation must at least establish that “[defendants] conspired to
cause [a third party] to make misrepresentations to [a federal agency]” (citing Tanner v.
United States, 483 U.S. 107, 132 (1987))).
176. Id. at 1126.
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Circuit’s decision to overturn a § 371 conviction in United States v.
Porter.177 But the court concluded by announcing: “In other words, the
defendants had a duty imposed pursuant to § 371 not to divert the benefit
of the MBE programs from their intended recipients . . . to themselves.”178
Rather than save this pronouncement as a dictum in its conclusion, the
court should have used it as a basis for distinguishing Porter. After all,
the Porter court held that those defendants were not under a duty to
choose the course of action preferred—but not mandated—by the
government.179
A Barker Steel Co. rubric founded on misrepresentation cannot be
applied to all acts of off-label marketing any more than the Klein rubric,
but one founded on the idea of regulated benefits can. We can generalize
from this principle in a way that takes into account the interrelatedness
of two distinct types of injuries: competitive injuries suffered by third
parties and nonpecuniary injuries suffered by the government. Stated
formally: even absent misrepresentations, a defendant may still defraud the
United States when (1) it undermines a legitimate government function
or objective (2) by securing for itself those benefits180 (3) intended solely
for another.181 As applied: a drug manufacturer, even when engaged in
truthful marketing, may defraud the United States if, in promoting a drug
for unapproved uses, it secures for itself those benefits of the new drug
approval process intended solely for those who have complied with the
regulatory scheme.
The usurpation of a regulated benefit goes to the core of frustrating the
FDA’s mission because it makes it inefficient for competitors to undertake
the costly process of securing a supplemental new drug application (SNDA)
when they could instead promote their drugs off-label. Of course, there
will be a question of fact, in the case of truthful off-label promotion, as
to whether the promoter really does secure for itself the regulated benefits
of another. In cases of direct-to-consumer advertisement, for example,
there is a clear usurpation of regulated benefits. But even the ability of a
company’s representatives to make claims about developments in scientific
evidence is treated as a regulated benefit of FDA approval.
177. Id. at 1130–31 (citing United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979)).
178. Id. at 1136.
179. See Porter, 591 F.2d at 1054–56 (overturning a § 371 conviction where the
defendant did not violate any Medicare rules, regulations, or requirements by using a
manual lab with which he could split reimbursement instead of an automated lab with
which he could not).
180. Cf. Barker Steel Co., 985 F.2d at 1134 (“The defendants’ actions, as alleged,
involved deceit and trickery to benefit the defendants by hampering a lawful government
function.”).
181. Cf. id. at 1132 (“The result was that a non-MBE got the benefit of contracts
which the MBE program intended for minority businesses.”).
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Competitors assert this legal conclusion, in another context, when they
bring unfair competition suits under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.182
Although section 43(a) cannot serve as a private right of action for
violation of FDA regulations, the standard for what constitute “false or
misleading”183 competitive claims reinforces the idea of FDA supremacy.
Even the government recognizes that the threat posed by such a suit
serves as an indirect means of FDA enforcement.184 In the case of Zeneca
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,185 the maker of a drug approved for reducing the
risk of breast cancer brought a Lanham Act suit against the maker of a
drug approved for postmenopausal osteoporosis on the grounds that the
defendant was promoting its drug as effective in reducing the risk of
breast cancer.186 The court’s decision is significant in two respects: it
recognizes that off-label promotion “hurt[s] competitors who are
marketing a drug that has been established” as appropriate for the use
being promoted, 187 and it establishes the FDA’s de facto authority in
concluding that off-label claims are false.188
A Lanham Act plaintiff can satisfy its burden of proving the literal
falsity of off-label claims by demonstrating that the tests relied on by the
promoter “are not sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude . . . that
they established the claim made.”189 On the question of whether the tests
were sufficiently reliable, the Zeneca court found that the “FDA’s
conclusion as reflected in the [drug’s] label and various FDA
documents . . . is persuasive evidence that [the defendant’s] claims to the

182. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006); see also HUTT ET AL., supra note 97, at 478
(describing the private unfair competition right of action created by the Lanham Act).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
184. Government prosecutors have, in the past, explicitly encouraged private
enforcement by pharmaceutical companies. For example, a First Assistant U.S. Attorney
for the District of Massachusetts once publicly encouraged companies to bring off-label
suits against their competitors in order to protect their lawfully gained labels. Paul
Greenberg & Tamar Sisitsky, Off-Label Marketing Investigations in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, ANALYSIS GROUP F., Fall/Winter 2006, at 3, 4, available at http://analysisgroup.
com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Forum_Fall06_Off-Label_Investigations.pdf; see
also HUTT ET AL., supra note 97, at 478 (discussing the Lanham Act briefly as one optional
avenue for parties to contest their competitors’ product claims).
185. Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 99 CIV. 1452(JKG), 1999 WL 509471
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999).
186. See id. at *1.
187. Id.
188. See id. at *33–34.
189. Id. at *31 (quoting McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d
1544, 1549 (2d Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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contrary are untrue.”190 In that case, the false claims were made both in
an absolute sense—that the drug was effective in reducing the risk of
cancer—and in a relative sense—that the drug was superior or
comparable to its competitor’s drug, which was approved for that use.191
The inescapable conclusion is that the FDA holds itself out as the only
institutional route through which investigative studies may be conducted
if one aim of those studies is to market a drug for an unapproved use.
Those who have conducted their studies under FDA guidance and
supervision benefit from making certain off-label claims. Those who
circumvent this scheme diminish the incentive the FDA offers those who
wish to enjoy its regulated benefits.
But where there is evidence of truthful off-label promotion by sales
representatives to practicing physicians, and there truly is sufficient
scientific evidence to preclude a finding of actual falsity, the fact finder
in a § 371 prosecution should be allowed to conclude that the manufacturer
did not secure for itself a benefit intended solely for another. The FDA
regulates drug labeling and advertisement, but it does not regulate
physician’s prescribing practices.192 Therefore, a discussion of recognized
therapeutic value does not interfere with an FDA function—the most
general formulation of the defraud offense. And in any event, the agency
may still protect its interests by bringing a number of other enforcement
actions against the manufacturer, including misdemeanor charges
under 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1).
The foregoing discussion of regulated benefits should not be confused
with the question of whether each conspirator expects to benefit from a
purported conspiracy to defraud the United States. In Gallup, the court
concluded that “benefit, or a ‘stake in the venture’ is not an element of
§ 371.”193 Benefit in that case referred not to the benefit gained by one
who participates in a federal scheme, but rather the benefit that might or
might not be gained by each individual conspirator—a pharmaceutical
company or the sales agencies with which it contracts—as a result of
participating in the conspiracy.
No single formulation of the defraud clause will provide guidance in
prosecuting all the conduct envisioned by Hammerschmidt as falling
within the scope the statute, but the benefits formulation offers the best
190. Id. at *34 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at *9.
192. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate
health care practitioner-patient relationship.”).
193. United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting United
States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 957 (3d Cir. 1979)).
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guidance in cases of off-label promotion. The significance of devising
an elegant formulation extends beyond the technicalities of criminal
pleading. Choosing the correct formulation allows both government and
industry to more accurately evaluate the legal significance of the conduct
at issue. Doing so will lead to both clarity in marketing practices and
accuracy in the calculation of the monies disgorged.
In the end, the institutional theory of off-label promotion is not at all
novel. Although it does little to rationalize the substantive concerns that
animate the FD&C Act’s prohibitions section, it speaks to a broader
governmental interest in the rule of law. But this interest works equally
against prosecutor and defendant, just as it should benefit equally both
the regulator and the regulated. The obvious advantage of having § 371
lie at the heart of prosecutions for regulatory crimes is that, however
obscure the text of that statute might be, there remains a source upon
which to build an intelligible doctrinal framework. The law should not
shy away from defining an offense for fear of undercutting its deterrent
effect. The institutional theory of off-label promotion plays an important
role in ensuring the efficacy of government, but its reach should extend
only so far as it can be neatly and concretely articulated.
V. CONCLUSION
If either theory presented in this Article is sufficient on its own to
sustain an enforcement action against any of the pharmaceutical
manufacturers, why care about carefully defining either one? The hope
is that each might offer something unique to industry and regulators
alike. The informational theory could offer a better understanding of
where conflicts might arise in the field, thus allowing pharmaceutical
counsel to implement more effective compliance programs. Likewise,
regulators can offer more nuanced guidance about what kinds of
communication they find most troubling, while relaxing restrictions on
legitimate scientific exchange. The institutional theory might provide
counsel with another framework for defending against government claims.
It might offer the government a framework for more articulately prosecuting
those claims. Both theories inform the structuring of remedies for
misbranding violations.
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